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This paper investigates the extent of vengeful feelings and their determinants using data on more than
89,000 individuals from 53 countries.  Country characteristics (such as per-capita income, average
education of the country, presence of an armed conflict, the extent of the rule-of-law, uninterrupted
democracy, individualism) as well as personal attributes of the individuals influence vengeful feelings.
The magnitude of vengeful feelings is greater for people in low-income countries, in countries with
low levels of education, low levels of the rule-of-law, in collectivist countries and in countries that
experienced an armed conflict in recent history.  Females, older people, working people, people who
live in high-crime areas of their country and people who are at the bottom 50% of their country's income
distribution are more vengeful.  The intensity of vengeful feelings dies off gradually over time.  The
findings suggest that vengeful feelings of people are subdued as a country develops economically
and becomes more stable politically and socially and that both country characteristics and personal
attributes are important determinants of vengeance.  Poor people who live in higher-income societies
that are ethno-linguistically homogeneous are as vengeful as rich people who live in low-income societies
that are ethno-linguistically fragmented.  These results reinforce the idea that some puzzles about individual
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“Thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.” 
Exodus 21:23-24 
 
“An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind”  
Attributed to Mahatma Gandhi. 
 
I.  Introduction 
It has been argued that revenge serves a number of objectives, ranging from righting 
perceived injustice to restoring self-worth of the vengeful individual (Cota-McKinley et al. 
2001).  The idea that vengeful behavior can stop potential offenders from committing similar 
crimes or from even considering similar crimes (Cota-McKinley et al. 2001, Wilson 1983) also 
suggests a deterrence effect of vengeance.     
It has been indicated that “Revenge is often tied to self-worth of the originally offended 
individual.  Frequently, individuals with little power seek revenge against powerful adversaries 
even though the action has overwhelming costs” (Kim and Smith, 1993).   This argument implies 
that investigation of the existence of vengeance, its extent and its determinants may be important 
not only for theoretical and practical aspects of the criminal justice system, but also because it 
may shed  light into extremely violent behavior such as suicide bombings and other terrorist 
attacks.   
Although vengeance is assumed to be an integral part of human behavior, little 
quantitative research exists on vengeance.  One obvious reason for the dearth is the difficulty of 
measurement.  A common procedure to measure an individual’s extent of vengeful feelings is to 
employ the widely-used Vengeance Scale (Stuckless and Goranson 1992).  This is a 7-point 
scale index based subjects’ responses to such hypothetical statements as “I am not a vengeful 2 
person”, “I try to even the score with anyone who hurts me,” and “It is always better not to seek 
vengeance,” Researchers have investigated the relationship between a vengeance index created 
this way and various behaviors, such as aggressive driving (Wiesenthal, Hennessy, and Gibson, 
2000). 
The dictionary definition of vengeance is “Punishment inflicted or retribution exacted for 
an injury or wrong.”   Consider a situation where having been subjected to a “wrong” means 
having been a victim of burglary in recent past and consider two individuals who are identical in 
all respects.  If one of these individuals was then burglarized, vengeful feelings can be identified 
by the difference in the severity of punishment these individuals wish to inflict on a convicted 
burglar.  This paper operationalizes this concept and provides evidence on the extent of 
vengeance using data on more than 89,000 individuals from 53 countries.  It also investigates the 
extent to which personal attributes of individuals, and cultural and country characteristics explain 
the degree of their vengeful feelings.   
People are likely to differ in their notions of fairness and in their beliefs about the level of 
appropriate punishment. Furthermore, victimization may prompt enhanced demand for 
protection, which may be mistaken for vengeance.  To address these issues, empirical analyses 
control for a host of personal characteristics that may be correlated with potential victimization 
and the demand for punishment.  These variables include, among others, age, gender, and 
education of the person, the rank of family income in the income distribution of the country and 
the burglary rate in the area of the residence of the person.   Furthermore, I present evidence 
indicating that having been victimized by burglary triggers vengeful feelings against a burglar, 
but having been victimized by other crimes such as robbery and theft does not trigger demand for 
harsher punishment for a burglar.  This indicates that the results are not due to a general desire to 
punish or a pre-existing demand for protection.  It is conceivable that vengeful feelings of people 3 
get stronger as they are exposed to more incidents of victimization.  I find evidence that this is 
the case for people who live in countries with undesirable political and economic environments. 
The paper is related to an emerging literature in economics that analyzes the impact of 
culture on violent or illicit behavior.  For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that the 
parking violations of the foreign diplomats who live in New York City are related to the extent 
of corruption in their home country.  Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath (2008) analyze the actions of 
the soccer players in five European soccer leagues and find that the cautions and ejections 
handed out by the referees due to rough play are correlated with whether or not the player’s 
home country was involved in a war or armed conflict.  They conclude that having been exposed 
to war or armed conflict increases the propensity for violence.
1    
This paper documents that the degree to which people want retaliation depends on both 
personal attributes and a number of country characteristics.  For example, vengeful feelings are 
stronger for people in low-income countries, in countries with low levels of education, low levels 
of rule-of-law, in countries that experienced a war in recent history and in countries which are 
fragmented ethno-linguistically.  Females, older people, working people, people who live in 
high-crime areas of their country and  people who are at the bottom 50% of their country’s 
income distribution are more vengeful.  There is also evidence indicating that vengeful feelings 
dissipate over time: having been victimized in recent past is associated with stronger vengeful 
feelings than having been victimized in more distant past. 
                                                 
1  There is also a broader  literature in economics that  investigates the impact of culture on 
economic behavior and outcomes.  For example, Fernandez and Fogli (2006) investigate the link between 
culture and fertility.   Alesina and Giulianao (2008) study the impact of culture, as measured by the 
strength of family ties, on labor force participation, living arrangements and geographical mobility of 
second generation immigrants in the U.S.   A summary on recent research on the impact of culture can be 
found  in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006). 
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  There are also implications for the criminal justice system.  The assumption that 
vengeance is an integral part of human psyche, and vengeful behavior is common and natural, 
along with the presumed deterrent effect of vengeful behavior give rise to the discussions of the 
role of vengeance in criminal justice system, and the extent to which vengeance should be an 
explicit part of the landscape of criminal law.  For example, Whitman (2004) argues that 
individuals who have committed violent acts of vengeance are compelled to justify these acts in 
the language of self-defense or extreme emotional disturbance.  He further states that “There is 
thus a kind of mismatch between our criminal law doctrine and the human motivations that give 
rise to violent crime.”  If vengeance is indeed hardwired into the human psychology, and if it is 
conceptually inseparable from justice itself as argued by Hegelian philosophy, then there may be 
reason to discuss the room for vengeance in an optimal punishment regime. (For a detailed 
discussion of this issue, see Whitman 2004).
2 
 In a different framework, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003) provide compelling evidence for 
the existence of vengeance in criminal punishment.  They find that victim characteristics affect 
sentence lengths in vehicular homicide, which is a crime where the victim is random.  This 
suggests that sentence lengths are determined, in part, by a taste for vengeance, which implies a 
need for a theory that incorporates the taste for vengeance.  
                                                 
2 The United States penal system is based on retributive justice, where punishment is based on the 
assumption of  “just deserts” (Wasserstrom 1978).   An individual may be punished only if he/she has 
committed the crime voluntarily; and the blameworthiness determines the level of punishment.   In the 
tradition of Bentham (1823) and Becker (1968), punishment has also a role of deterrence, but the extent 
of punishment should not be determined by emotion or vengeance.  The desire for vengeance is not 
considered as legitimate in criminal law (Whitman, 2004); and it is argued that criminal law defenses 
reflect the need for a liberal polity to control vengeance (Nourse 2003).  Any indication of vengeance-
tainted punishment raises trepidations for legal scholars.  For example, concerns have been raised that the 
1991 Supreme Court decision in Payne v. Tennessee to allow victim impact statements during the penalty 
phase of a murder trial would introduce inappropriate emotion and vengeance to the sentencing hearing 
(Hoffman 2003,  Bandes 1996, Long 1995).   5 
Section II describes the data.  Section III presents information on the vengeful feelings at 
the country level.  Section IV describes the analyses conducted at the individual level and 
Section V presents the results of these analyses.  Section VI investigates the determinants of 
vengeance. A discussion of the results and their implications are provided in Section VII, and 
Section VIII  offers a conclusion. 
 
II.  Data and the Measurement of the Desire to inflict Punishment 
The data are obtained from the International Crime Victim Survey compiled by the 
United Nations Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Table 1 presents the list of 
countries included in the analysis.   The countries were surveyed either in 1989, 2000, or 
between 1992 and 1996.  Some countries were surveyed in more than one year.  The key variable 
for this paper is based on the answer to the following two questions: “People have different ideas 
about the sentences which should be given to offenders.  Take for instance the case of a man of 
20 years old who is found guilty of burglary for the second time.  This time, he has stolen a 
colour TV.  Which of the following sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such a 
case?”  The alternatives given are: fine, prison, community service, suspended sentence, any 
other sentence (to specify), and don’t know.  For those respondents who declared that a prison 
sentence is appropriate, the following question is asked: “For how long do you think he should 
go to prison?”  Fifteen alternatives are given to this question, which are: one month or less, 2-6 
months, 6 months-1 year, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-
19 years, 20-24 years, more than 24 years, life sentence, and don’t know. 
Table 1 displays the percentage of individuals in each country who declared the 
appropriateness (according to them) of various sentence lengths.  The first column displays the 
proportion of individuals in each country who indicated that a prison sentence of two years or 6 
longer  would be appropriate punishment for a burglar who is convicted for stealing a color TV 
as his second offense.  The second column displays the proportion of respondents who would 
like to impose a sentence of 4 or more years; and the third column reports the proportion who 
suggests a prison sentence of at least 6 years.  These percentages include every respondent 
regardless of whether they were a victim of a crime themselves.  As expected, the proportion of 
individuals who prefer longer prison terms declines in each country.  The last column exhibits 
the proportion of the respondents who would like to administer a life sentence for burglary.  
Although a very negligible fraction of the respondents suggested a life sentence for burglary in 
most countries, a sizable portion of individuals chose this option in some countries.  For 
example, 14 percent of the respondents in Botswana, and 7 percent in both Costa Rica and 
Zimbabwe declared that a life sentence would be appropriate.  The rate is about 4 percent in 
China.   
A comparison of countries for a given desired sentence length reveals substantial 
differences.  For example, in China, Romania and Botswana  39-to-40 percent of the people 
prefer a prison sentence of 4 or more years.  The rate is 25 percent in South Africa, 18-to-20 
percent in Egypt, Ukraine, Paraguay and Georgia,  16 percent in Canada and Indonesia,  12 
percent in the U.S. and Philippines, about 4 percent in Norway and Slovenia, and 1 percent in 
Belgium and Spain.  
 
III.  Vengeful Feelings at the Country Level 
The information displayed in Table 1 is not a reflection of vengeful feelings.  It merely 
pertains to the level of the desired stiffness of punishment.  There are at least three reasons why 
the preference for harsh punishment might differ across countries.  First, the question pertains to 
stealing a color TV.  This action carries different monetary values in different countries.  A color 7 
TV constitutes a larger fraction of personal income in a developing country than a developed 
one.  Thus, the desired penalty for the theft of a color TV is expected to differ between countries.   
Second, criminal penalties and the culture of illegality differ between countries.  Imagine two 
otherwise similar countries.  If the first country has developed a more strict penal code with 
harsher penalties than the second country, the citizens of the first country may be expected to 
propose more strict penalties for burglary in comparison to those of the second country.
5   Third, 
the desired punishment level of each person may, in part, be determined by the level of 
prevailing criminal activity. Put differently, an individual’s response to the desired punishment 
for burglary may contain his/her reactions to the extent of the crime rate in the region of country 
that he/she resides.    
Because of these reasons, I will analyze the data by focusing on the variation of the 
responses to the revealed desired punishment within a country.  As will be demonstrated in the 
next section, personal characteristics (such as age, education etc.) are similar between those who 
were victimized and who were not.   Further, I will address the issue of potential differences 
between the individuals who were victimized and who were not victimized in the next section 
when I analyze the individual-level data.   However, as a first approximation, the strength of 
vengeful feelings at the country level can be measured as the difference between the proportion 
of individuals who would like to assign a particular prison sentence for a burglar given that they 
themselves were victims of burglary, and the proportion of individuals who were not victimized 
but who would like to see the same sentence handed out to a burglar.  For example, in Brazil 8 
percent of the individuals, who were not victims of burglary, consider a prison term of at least 4 
years as the appropriate punishment for a burglar who  stole a color TV as a second offense.  On 
                                                 
5 On the other hand, it should be noted that if a country has a very harsh penalty for burglary (e.g. losing a 
limb), then, suggesting a 6 year prison term for burglary in that country may be considered a lenient 
treatment. 8 
the other hand, 14 percent of the people who were victimized by a burglar in Brazil believe that 
the same punishment is appropriate.   The six percentage-point difference can be attributable to 
the effect of vengeful feelings due to having been victimized by a burglar.  
If being burglarized does not trigger vengeful feelings towards a burglar, then the 
proportion of individuals who desire a certain level of punishment should be the same among 
groups of victimized and non-victimized people.   Figure 1 displays, for each country, the 
proportion of individuals who desire at least a 2-years prison term for a burglar who stole a color 
TV as his second offense.  The horizontal axis displays the rate among people who were not 
victimized, and the vertical axis measures the rate among those who were victimized.   The solid 
line is the 45-degree line.  As Figure 1 demonstrates most countries lie above the 45-degree line, 
indicating that the tendency to demand a stiffer penalty is higher among those who are 
victimized.
6 
Figures 2 and 3 display similar information.  Figure 2 presents the proportion of people in 
each country who believe that a sentence of at least 4 years in prison is appropriate; and Figure 3 
displays the rates pertaining to desired sentence of at least 6 years.  Figures 4A and 4B present 
the rates of males and females who prefer a punishment of at least 4 years in prison.  The gender-
specific rates pertaining to the proportion of individuals who would like a sentence of at least 2 
years or at least 6 years were similar to Figures 4A and 4B.  As can be seen the disparity between 
the reaction of victims and non-victims is particularly significant in some countries.  On the other 
hand a few countries, such as Botswana and China are located under the 45-degree line. 
 
                                                 
6  For these figures I employ all people with non-missing responses to victimization and desired 
punishment questions even if some of their personal attributes are missing.  Thus, the sample sizes are 
larger behind these figures, a total of more than 175,000 people in all countries.  Albania, which is 
included in the graphs, could not be included in empirical analyses because it has only six individuals 
with non-missing values for all explanatory variables. 9 
IV.  Individual-level Analysis 
I hypothesize that vengeful feelings can be measured by the discrepancy in desired 
punishment between victims and non-victims.  On the other hand, the discrepancy, or part of the 
discrepancy, may pre-exist.  Individuals who live in high crime areas (where the risk of 
victimization is higher) may have higher demands for punishment.  That is, these individuals 
may prefer stiffer penalties for a deterrent effect to reduce their risk of victimization.  Similarly, 
individuals who have lower risks of victimization may prefer lesser punishments.  If the risk of 
victimization is highly correlated with actual victimization revealed in the data, then the 
observed differences displayed in Figures 1-4 may be due to pre-existing preferences about 
optimal punishment, and not necessarily because of the vengeful feelings that emerge after 
victimization.   
The risk of victimization can be related to personal characteristics of the person, such as 
age, education and income level, labor market activity, and marital status.   Although the 
descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 below do not reveal differences in personal 
characteristics of individuals by victimization, it is important to control for potential 
confounding.  Thus, I estimate individual-level regressions depicted by Equation (1) below. 
(1)   Pij= δ0+δ1Vij +Xij’δ2+Kj’δ3+uij, 
 
where Pij stands for desired punishment for burglary as revealed by individual i who lives in 
country j.  Vij is a dichotomous variable to indicate if the individual has been a victim of burglary 
in the recent past.  The coefficient δ1  is expected to be positive if, all else the same, being a 
victim of a burglary prompts a desire to inflict harsher punishment.  X is a vector of personal 
characteristics, including age, gender, marital status, gun ownership, the level of education, labor 
market status of the individual and whether the individual’s family income is located in the upper 10 
50 percent of the income distribution in that country.  These attributes may be correlated with the 
risk of victimization and the desire to impose stiffer punishment.   Other variables that 
potentially impact the risk of victimization are the size of the city the person resides in, and the 
burglary rate in the region of the country where the individual lives.   
The variables in vector K pertain to country characteristics.  They allow for an 
investigation of the impact of country attributes on the desire to impose punishment. In addition 
to acting as control variables, these country characteristics will allow for an investigation as to 
whether the extent of vengeful feeling are influenced by such country attributes.   Following La 
Porta et al. (1999) and Treisman (2000), I include variables that measure the structure of the 
existing legal system in the country.  La Porta et al. (1999) argue that the common law system 
developed in England in the 17
th century has been shaped by the parliament and aristocracy at 
the expense of the crown and it is intended to limit the power of the sovereign.  As a 
consequence, British common law puts emphasis on individuals’ private and property rights, and 
it intends to limit, rather than strengthen, the power of the state (David and Brierley 1978, Finer 
1997, La Porta et al., 1999).  In comparison, French civil law, Scandinavian civil law and 
German civil law are designed as instruments of the state to expand its power; and socialist law 
is a manifestation of the state’s intent to create institutions to maintain power and extract 
resources without much regard for protecting economic interests (La Porta et al. 1999).  To 
control for the structure of the existing legal system in the country, I include variables to measure 
the legal origin of the country.  They are: whether the country’s legal system is based on British 
common law, French civil law, Scandinavian civil law, German civil law, or Socialist legal 
origin.     
Religious make-up of the country may be a potentially important determinant of  both 
individuals’ demand for stiff penalties and  the extent of the demand for retribution. Religious 11 
composition is controlled for by the proportion of Catholic, proportion of Muslim and proportion 
of Protestant in the country.   If interrupted democracy in the country and involvement in a war 
in recent history are correlated with social disorder, they may impact people’s exposure to 
violence and as a result, the extent of their willingness to punish.  I employ the same measure of 
war/armed conflict as used by Miguel et al. (2008), obtained from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed 
Conflict data set. 
 Per-capita income in the country is another country attribute included in the analyses.  A 
large government may create more occasions for individuals to interact with government 
workers, increasing the exposure to corruption, potentially influencing their desire to punish.  On 
the other hand a large government may be correlated with a more developed welfare system that 
may mitigate strong feelings to punish.  To control for this effect, I add a variable which is the 
share of government in per-capita gross domestic product.   The average level of education in the 
country, which is an aggregate measure of the human capital, the size of the population of the 
country, the percentage of young people in the population and the proportion of seats held by 
women in the parliament are additional variables that are added to control for country attributes.  
Ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the country, the extent of individualistic culture 
prevailing in the country, and prevalence of the rule-of-law in the country are additional control 
variables to capture some cultural dimensions of the countries. The Rule-of-Law index is 
obtained from the World Bank.
7  It measures “the extent of which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” Kaufmann,  Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2007).  The range of the index is from -2.5 indicating the weakest rule-of-law environment, to 
2.5 representing the strongest.   In our sample, the lowest score of rule-of-law is -1.71 and it 
                                                 
7 (http://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi2007/ mc_countries.asp.) 12 
belongs to Zimbabwe.  Kyrgyzstan and Belarus have second and third lowest scores of -1.18 and 
-1.16.  Norway and Denmark have the highest scores of the rule-of-law, with 2.02 and 2.03 
respectively.  Slovakia is at the sample median with 0.43. 
 Another measure of cultural differences is the index of individualism as employed 
Hermann, Thőni and Gächter (2008).   The index is developed by Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede 
(2005).
8  Lower values indicate the extent of collectivism of the society, which stands for the 
extent to which individuals are integrated into groups.  Higher values of the index represent 
individualistic societies where the ties between individuals are loose, and where people are 
expected to look after themselves and their immediate family.  In collectivist societies, people 
from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families (with 
uncles, aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty.
9   In our sample, the United States is the most individualistic country with a score of 91, 
followed by Australia with a score of 90 and the U.K. with 89.  The most collectivist societies 
in the data are Colombia with a score of 13, Indonesia with a score of 14 and Costa Rica with a 
score of 15. Slovakia Czech Republic and Austria are around the median score of 57.   
The ethno-linguistic fragmentation index measures the probability that two randomly 
selected people in a given country in 1985 will not belong to the same ethno-linguistics group.  
This index, which is obtained from (Roeder 2001), has been used in research in both economics 
and political science (Smith 2004, Easterly and Levine 1997).  In the data, the most ethno-
linguistically homogenous country is Portugal with the value of the index being 0.007, followed 
by Hungary with 0.01.  The two most heterogeneous countries are Uganda and South Africa with 
                                                 
8 The data are downloaded from  http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php. 
9  The description is obtained from (http://www.geert-hofstede.com/geert_hofstede_ resources.shtml). 13 
score of 0.922 and 0.886, respectively. Belarus is at the mean with score of 0.374, and the U.S. 
has a score of 0.575. 
 Table 2 displays the definitions and the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in 
empirical analyses.  The first column of numbers provides the descriptive statistics of the 
observations with non-missing personal and country characteristics.  The second column displays 
the descriptive statistics of the sample which with non-missing personal characteristics.   The 
third column provides the same information with the omission of the two variables that gauge the 
size of the city.  Exclusion of these city size variables from the regressions did not alter either the 
magnitude or the statistical significance of the other coefficients, but allowed an increase in the 
sample size. 
To provide a sense of the difference between people who were and who were not 
victimized, Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the personal characteristics by 
victimization.  The average personal characteristics, including gun ownership, income and 
education, of those who were victimized this year or last year and who were not victimized 
during the same time period are similar.  The same is true for victimization before last year, 
indicating that there are no obvious and systematic differences in observable characteristics 
between those were victimized and those who were not.   In fact, the burglary rate in the locality 
of those where were victimized are lower than the burglary rate in the locality of people who 
were not victimized. 
 
V.  Results 
Table 4 displays the results of the ordered probit models, where the dependent variable 
consists of 6 categories, measuring the severity of desired punishment.  These are: 1) if the 
person declared that the appropriate punishment is something other than a prison sentence (such 14 
as fine, community service, suspended sentence); 2) if the person declared that the appropriate 
punishment is a prison sentence of 1-to-6 months; 3) the appropriate punishment is declared as 6 
months-to-a year prison term; 4) 2-to-3 years in prison; 5) 4-to-5 years in prison; 5) 6 years-to-
life in prison.    The proportions of responses in each category are: 62 %, 10%, 12%, 8%, 4% and 
4%, respectively. 
Three specifications are displayed in Table 4.  All specifications include time dummies to 
control for the year in which the survey was registered in that country and the standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the country-level.  The first column reports the results obtained from 
the entire sample with non-missing personal and country attributes.  Because the variables which 
measure the size of the city the person lives in were never significant and because in a few 
countries this information was not collected, and because dropping these variables did not alter 
the remaining coefficients, I dropped these two variables and re-estimated the model.  The results 
that are reported in column II are almost identical to the ones displayed in column I.   Finally, 
results of column III are based on the specification that includes country fixed effects, instead of 
the country characteristics.  Again, the magnitudes and the statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients do not change.    
The existence of vengeful feelings is identified by comparing the reactions of individuals 
who have identical observable personal characteristics but who differ in their victimization 
experience.  The first two coefficient reported at the top of Table 4 demonstrate evidence of 
vengeful behavior.  Specifically, individuals who were victims of burglary this year or last year, 
prefer stiffer penalties for burglars in comparison to those who were not victimized.  In addition, 
being a victim of burglary two years ago or earlier has an additional positive effect on the desire 
to impose stiffer penalties.    15 
Other coefficients listed in Table 4 demonstrate the impact of a particular personal or 
country attribute on the level of desired punishment.  For example, if the individual or anyone 
else in that household owns a gun, the intensity of the desire for stiffer punishment is stronger, 
suggesting that characteristics of the individuals that make them more likely to own a gun induce 
them to impose harsher penalties.   An increase in the burglary rate in the region that the 
individual lives in has also a positive impact on the intensity of the desire to impose harsher 
punishment.  Males prefer stronger punishment in comparison to females, and older individuals 
are more lenient in comparison to younger individuals.  Singles and widows are also more 
lenient.  On the other hand, working people, and retired or disabled individuals are harsher 
regarding the desired level of punishment.  The legal origin of the country has an impact on the 
desired level of punishment as do other country attributes such as rule-of-law, individualism, 
women in the parliament and uninterrupted democracy.   The proportion of women in the 
parliament is negatively associated with the intensity of the desire to impose harsh punishment.   
Although the rule of law in the country and the extent of individualism in the country are highly 
positively correlated, these variables have different impacts on the desired stiffness of 
punishment.  While the extent of individualism in the country has a negative impact on the 
desired level of punishment, a higher value for the rule-of-law is positively associated with 
stiffer desired punishment.  
As described in the introduction, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003) find that victim 
characteristics affect sentence lengths in vehicular homicide.  To justify this result, an argument 
can be made that juries and judges implicitly calculate the social welfare loss associated with 
each victim’s death, and they assign differential values for each victim type, which is then 
translated to the severity of the sentence.  In our case, however, such a justification is not valid.  
This is because the individuals who are analyzed here were asked to provide information about a 16 
hypothetical 20 year old male burglar.  This does not imply that the respondent in our data set 
would not be more or less vengeful against females, older criminals, or towards certain race or 
ethnicity classes, but the results in Table 4 demonstrate that there is an overall vengeful attitude, 
which stems from the person’s own past victimization experience. 
Note that the results of Table 4 indicate that vengeful feelings dissipate slowly over time.  
Individuals who were victims of burglary this year or last year would like to impose stiffer 
penalties on a burglar.  If victimization took place before last year, this event still has an impact 
on the demand for retribution, but the magnitude of the impact is smaller. This suggests that 
people forgive and forget slowly. This finding is reinforced below when I estimate probit 
equations for the probability of asking for various sentence lengths. 
 
Are Vengeful Feelings Event-Specific? 
The results of Table 4 indicate that people who were victims of burglary demand stiffer 
penalties for a burglar in comparison to those individuals who were not victimized.  An 
interesting question is whether or not other types of victimization trigger vengeful feelings 
towards burglars as well.  In other words, do people who were victims of other crimes, such as 
theft or robbery, demand stiffer punishments for a burglar?  To investigate this question, I re-
estimated the models displayed in Table 4 by including an indicator variable to represents if the 
person was a victim of robbery this year or last year.  I also ran the models with the following 
indicator variables: if the person was a victim of personal theft, victim of bicycle theft, or if 
he/she was physically assaulted.  
Table 5 displays the results.  In each of the four specifications reported, an additional 
victimization indicator is included (in addition to being a victim of burglary).  For example, the 
model in column 1 includes an additional dichotomous indicator to measure if the individual was 17 
a victim of robbery this year or last year.  Columns 2, 3 and 4 report the models which include  
indicator variables of whether the person suffered from personal theft this or last year, had a 
bicycle stolen this or last year, or was assaulted this or last year, respectively.  As can be seen, 
having been a victim of robbery, theft, or bicycle theft in the past has no additional impact on 
vengeful feelings towards a burglar; but being a victim of an assault increases the extent of 
vengeful feelings (column 4).  Dropping the burglary victimization variables but keeping the 
variable to indicate victimization for other crimes did not alter at all the remaining coefficients; 
and estimating the models with country fixed-effects provided the same results as in Table 5. 
The results of Table 5 indicate that vengeful feelings are specific.  They are targeted to 
the person who is believed to have generated the harm in the first place.  People who were 
victimized by burglary have vengeful feelings about burglars; but having been victims of 
robbery, theft or bicycle theft does not evoke vengeful feelings about burglars. This suggests that 
the identified vengeance effect is not likely to be driven by a general attitude about crime, or by a 
demand for protection that would be correlated with all types of victimization.  The exception is 
physical assault.  Having been physically assaulted increases people’s desire to impose heavier 
punishment for burglary, indicating that physical victimization triggers stronger feelings than 
being victims of other crimes.  This may suggest that having been targeted for violence may 
augment retaliatory feelings. 
 
VI.  What Determines Vengeance? 
The identification of the extent of vengeful feelings is obtained from the responses of 
individuals who differ in their victimization experience.  As shown in the previous section, 
controlling for personal characteristics and a host of country attributes (or country fixed effects), 
having been a victim of burglary increases one’s desire to impose harsher punishment on a 18 
hypothetical burglar.  In this section I investigate the extent to which these vengeful feelings are 
influenced by personal characteristics of the individuals or the attributes of the countries they 
live in.  For example, I will ask question such as:  are males more vengeful than females?  Are 
more educated people in a country more vengeful than less educated people in the same country?  
Are people who live in high-crime areas in a country more vengeful than people in the same 
country who live in low-crime areas?  Are people who live in poorer countries more vengeful 
than people who live in richer countries?  What are the impacts on the strength of vengeful 
feelings of the rule-of-law, the level of individualism, having experienced a war in recent history, 
or having an uninterrupted democracy in the country? 
  To identify the impact of personal and country characteristics on vengeful feelings, I 
estimate a sequence of probit regressions, where the world population in the data set is divided 
into two groups for each regression.  For example, I classify people by their gender.  I run 
separate probit regressions for males and females to investigate if being a victim of burglary has 
an impact on the probability of  a) imposing any prison sentence on a burglar,  b) imposing a 
sentence of at least 2 years, c) imposing a sentence of at least 4 years. 
 
The Impact of Personal Attributes 
Table 6A reports the marginal effects obtained from running these probit regressions for 
males and females in the sample.  Each regression contains the complete set of explanatory 
variables used in column II of Table 4.  I also report the marginal effects obtained from the 
models that control for country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. They are reported 
in [brackets].  The top panel of Table 6A shows that in the sample of 35,443 men from 53 
countries, controlling for all personal and country characteristics, if a man was a victim of 
burglary this year or last year, his propensity to impose a prison sentence (as opposed to no 19 
sentence, a fine, or community service) is 2 percentage points higher in comparison to a man 
who was not victimized.  Table 6A also reports that in the model with country fixed-effects, 
where the sample size is [41,832], victimization of men increases the probability of suggesting a 
prison sentence by 2.4 percentage points.   The top panel of table 6A also reports that the mean 
of the dependent variable is 0.413 for men, indicating that 41.3% of the men in the world want to 
impose a prison sentence for burglary. 
The right-hand panel of Table 6A displays the same information for females.  Using 
39,345 females from 53 countries, I find that having been burglarized increases females’  
propensity to impose a prison sentence for a hypothetical burglar by 3.7 percentage points.   
Thus, according to top panel of Table 6A females are more vengeful than males, because having 
been burglarized this year or last year increases females’ propensity to impose a prison sentence 
more than that of males (3.7 percentage point vs. 2.0 percentage point in models with country 
characteristics and 3.3 percentage points vs. 2.4 percentage points in models with country fixed 
effects).  Furthermore, the baseline demand for punishment is lower for females: 36.8 percent of 
females versus 41.3 percent of males demand a prison term, implying that the effects  are 
relatively stronger for females.   
 Another way to put these numbers into perspective is to consider the following 
simulation.  At the bottom line of the top panel of Table 6A, the descriptive statistics reveal that 
36.8 % of all females would like to impose a prison term punishment for burglary.  If all females 
in the world were switched from being non-victimized to victimized, this would increase the 
demand for a prison term by females by 10% (0.037/0.368).  If all males in the world were 
switched from being non-victimized to victimized, this would increase males’ demand for a 
prison term by 4.8%  (0.020/0.413). 20 
The top panel of Table 6A indicates that having been victimized before last year has no 
statistically significant vengeful effects for either gender if the desired punishment pertains to 
any prison term.  The middle panel of the table, however, shows that  having been victimized this 
or last year and having been victimized before last year both have impacts on vengeful feelings if 
the punishment for burglary involves at least a two-year prison term.  However, as discussed 
earlier, the marginal effects of  having been victimized before last year are smaller, suggesting 
that victimization in more distant past triggers vengeful feelings that are weaker.  In the middle 
panel the marginal effects are almost identical between males and females, and the baseline 
desired punishment rates also similar (0.180 and 0.156).  The bottom panel of Table 6A presents 
the same information based on the desire to impose a prison term of at least 4 years. 
Culture vs.  Individual Characteristics 
The results displayed in Table 6A are summarized in the first two rows of Table 7.  
Specifically, Table 7 presents the calculations based on the coefficients reported in Table 6 to 
address the issue of relative vengefulness of various groups, such as males-females, people in 
high income countries vs. people in low income countries, people who live in areas of their 
countries with above-median burglary rate vs. people who live in below-median burglary rate 
areas. For example, the first two rows of Table 7 display the difference in vengeful feelings 
between males and females.  Based on the marginal effects reported in Table 6A and the existing 
rates of desired punishment in these groups, also reported in Table 6A, if males were switched 
from being non-victims to being victims of burglary, this would increase their existing desire to 
impose a sentence of 4-plus years by 23 percent [and 19 percent in case of the model with 
country fixed effects].  If all females were victimized, this would increase females’ desire to 
inflict a 4-plus years of punishment by 26 percent [or 23% in the model with fixed effects].  Note 
that in column III of Table 7 the rate of increase in the desire to punish is zero for men (row A1), 21 
because the estimated marginal effect is not significantly different from zero in this case (the 
bottom panel of table 6A for males).  However, the impact is 16% in the model with country 
fixed-effects.  Looking across the rows A1 and A2 of Table 7, we see that in all cases 
victimization increases the desire to inflict punishment more strongly for women than men; that 
is, women seem to be more vengeful than men.   
Table 4 demonstrates that the coefficient of male is positive and significant in the models 
that explain the propensity to impose stiffer penalties, while the results displayed in Table 6A 
and summarized in Table 7 suggest that females are more vengeful than males.  These results are 
not inconsistent, because the first groups of results indicate the desired level of harshness of the 
penalty, while the second is about vengeance.  Put differently, while men demand stiffer 
penalties, women react more strongly than men in response to being victimized. 
  Table 6B reports the results of the investigation of the impact of personal education on 
vengeful feelings.  Each person in the data set is classified as having above-median education or 
below-median education in comparison to the median education level of their own country.  As 
shown in the top panel of Table 6B, the mean of the dependent variable for highly-educated 
people is 0.362 for a jail or prison term.  This means that 36.2 percent of people who are 
relatively more educated (in comparison to their country’s median education) would like impose 
a prison term on a burglar.  Victimization among this group increases this propensity by 2.1 
percentage points.  Among people who are less educated (those who have less education than 
their country median) the proportion who wants to impose a prison sentence is 0.413, and 
victimization among less-educated people increases their propensity to impose a prison term by 
3.4 percentage points.   As before, these results are summarized in Table 7.  Victimization has a 
similar impact on the propensity to impose a prison sentence between people who have above-
median education and below-median education in their own country.  If all relatively more 22 
educated people were victimized, this would increase the proportion who wants to impose a 
prison sentence of 2 year or more by 30% in this group.  On the other hand, if all relatively less-
educated people were victimized, this would increase the rate of those who wants to impose a 
minimum 2 years of prison term by 11 percent among less-educated group, suggesting that more 
educated people are more vengeful.  The third column of Table 7 shows that the reverse is true if 
we analyze the propensity to impose a sentence of at least 4 years.   Thus, looking across rows 
B1 and B2 of Table 7, it is hard to make a statement about relative vengefulness of more 
educated people in comparison to less educated ones. 
  Rows C-F of Table 7, on the other hand, depict a clearer picture as to the impact of 
personal attributes on vengeful feelings.  Specifically, burglarization of working people around 
the world prompts stronger reactions about their desired punishment to be imposed on a burglar 
in comparison to burglarization of nonworking people (rows E1 and E2).  The same is true for 
people who live in above-median burglary areas of their countries in comparison to those who 
live in low burglary areas (rows F1 and F2), and people who are older than 40 years of age (C1 
and C2). Similarly, people who are at the bottom 50% of their country’s income distribution are 
more vengeful than those who are in the top 50% (rows D1 and D2).  Summary tables pertaining 
to these results are presented in Tables 6C to 6F in the Appendix. 
Rows G-M of table 7 display the impacts pertaining to the classification of people by 
their country characteristics.  Some of these characteristics pertain to economic development 
such as per-capita income; some others can be claimed to be correlated with “cultural” aspects of 
these societies such as the extent of individualism or ethno-linguistic fragmentation in the 
country.  The corresponding regression results are summarized in tables 6G-6M in the Appendix.    
Section G divides people into two groups:  Those who live in countries where the average 
education in the country is above the world median in the sample of 53 countries, (which is 8 23 
years); and those people who live in countries where the average country education is below the 
world mean.  Rows G1 and G2 demonstrate that people who live in countries with low education 
are more vengeful than those who live in more educated countries.  Other country differences 
also influence vengeful feelings.  For example, people who live in countries that are more 
fragmented ethno-linguistically are more vengeful than people who live in more homogeneous 
countries.  Similarly, people who live in more collective (less individualistic) societies, and those 
who live in countries that experienced a war or armed conflict in recent history, are more 
vengeful.  People who live in countries where per-capita income is less than $8,000, which is the 
world median in the sample, are more vengeful than people who live in richer countries. 
Although some of these country characteristics are reasonably highly correlated with per-
capita income in the country, this is not the case for all country attributes.  For example, there are 
six countries in the sample that experienced a war or armed conflict since 1975 although their 
average per-capita income is greater than $8,000.  These countries are United Kingdom, Spain, 
United States, Russia,  Slovenia and Argentina.  There are also 16 countries with less than 
$8,000 per-capita income but have not involved in a war or armed conflict since 1975 (Poland, 
Latvia, Macedonia, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Mongolia,  Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, 
Botswana,  Costa Rica, Brazil and Bolivia).  Similarly, there is no strong correlation between  
ethno-linguistic fragmentation and per-capita income in the country.   
Table 7 demonstrates that both personal characteristics and country characteristics are 
important in determining the extent of vengeful feelings.  This suggests that country attributes 
alone are not reliable predictors in identifying vengeful behavior.  For example, although low 
levels of per-capita income in a country, ethno-linguistics fragmentation or having experienced a 
war are positively related to vengeful feelings, personal characteristics of the individuals such as 24 
age, the crime rate in the locality of the individual, and the ranking of the individual’s family 
income  in his/her country’s income distribution are also important.   
To make the point visible, I classified the people in the world into two categories: those 
who live in countries with low per-capita income (<$8,000) and with high ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation (above the world mean), but whose incomes rank in the top 50% of their own 
country’s income distribution. The second category consists of people who live in richer 
countries, that also have low ethno-linguistic fragmentation.  But people in this group have 
incomes that are in the bottom 50% of the income distribution of their country.  Estimating 
probit regressions as the ones reported in Tables 6 revealed that there is no meaningful difference 
in terms of the strength of vengeful feelings between these two groups of people.  In all cases, 
having been victimized sparks vengeful feelings.  However, the strength of these feelings is not 
different between these two groups.  The results are summarized in rows N1 and N2 of Table 7.   
In the group of (relatively) rich people who live in low-per-capita GDP and highly fragmented 
societies, switching them group from being non-victims to victims of burglary increases their 
demand for a prison term for a burglar by 9 percent (shown in the first column).   Row N2 
displays that the same switch among relatively poor people who live in richer and more 
homogeneous countries increases the demand for a prison term by 6 percent.  Looking across 
rows N1 and N2 reveals that there is no substantial difference in the strength of the reaction  to 
victimization between these groups; i.e. their vengeful feelings are similar. 
Rows O1 and O2 present the results of a similar analysis conducted for the following two 
groups: Poorer people (people who are in the bottom of the 50% of their countries income 
distribution), who are older (greater than 40 years of age), who live in high-burglary areas of 
their own countries, and who live in countries with no war or armed conflict experience since 
1975.  As rows C, D and F of Table 7 display, these personal attributes are positively correlated 25 
with vengeful feelings.  On the other hand, having experienced no war in the country in recent 
history is associated with less vengeful feelings (row H).  The second group of people possesses 
the opposite attributes.  They live in a country that experienced a war or armed conflict since 
1975, but they are younger than 40, located in the upper 50% of their country’s income 
distribution and live in low-burglary areas.  The comparison between these two groups reveals 
that the strength of their vengeful feelings is comparable (rows O1 and O2). 
The upshot of these results is the following.  Although a number of personal and country 
attributes have significant impacts on vengeful feelings, a more complete picture of vengeful 
behavior involves a combination of these attributes.  As shown in Table 7, some of these factors 
can counter-balance each other (such as being a rich person in a poor country) and it may be 
misleading to attribute vengeful feelings to a particular characteristic.   
 
Excess Vengeance 
The results presented so far demonstrate that there is evidence for vengeful feelings.  All 
else the same, people who were victimized by burglary demand stiffer penalties for a burglar in 
comparison to those who were not victimized; and the strength of these vengeful feelings 
depends on a number of personal and country characteristics.  In this sub-section I ask the 
following question. Among the group of people who were victimized, does the strength of 
vengeful feelings depend on repeated victimization?  To address this issue, I analyze the sample 
of people who were victimized this year or last year, or who were victimized before last year.  
An indicator variable is created that differentiates between two groups of people: 1) People who 
were victimized both during this year or last year and before last year. 2) People who were 
victimized in either during this year or last year or before last year, but not both.   26 
In this sample which consists of victimized people, any residual unobservable that may 
be correlated with victimization should be similar between individuals.  Using this sample I 
investigate if having been victimized more heavily (repeatedly) makes people more vengeful in 
comparison to those who have less severe victimization experience.  Estimating probit 
regressions to analyze the impact of heavy victimization defined this way on the probability of 
demanding  i) any prison sentence  ii) a prison sentence of at least 2 years and  iii) a sentence of 
at least 4 years revealed that the coefficient of heavy victimization was positive in all cases but 
significant only in the range of  0.15-0.4 level.  However, estimation of the same models in sub-
samples of the world population, displayed in Table 8, revealed very interesting patterns.   
Table 8 shows that there is no difference in the severity of the vengeful feelings between 
those who were victimized less heavily and those who are victimized more heavily if these 
victims live in countries where the average country education is above the world median (row 
A1),  if there was no war or military conflict in the country since 1975 (row B1),  if the rule-of-
law rating of the country is high (row C1), if the country’s per-capita income is higher than 
$8,000 (row D1), if the country is individualistic (row E1), if the country is homogeneous ethno-
linguistically (row F1), or has enjoyed uninterrupted democracy (row G1). 
On the other hand, people who are victimized more heavily are more vengeful in 
comparison to those who are victimized less heavily if the country they live in has poor 
education (row A2), has experienced a war (row B2), suffers from low rule-of-law (row C2), if 
the country is poor (row D2), if the country is collectivist (row E2), ethno-linguistically 
fragmented (row F2), or if the democratic structure has been interrupted (row G2). 
In other words, additional victimization triggers additional vengeance only in countries 
that suffer from low income, low education, no adherence to the rule-of-law and similar 
attributes listed in Table 8.  This finding is interesting because it suggests that a feeling such as 27 
vengeance, which usually is thought of as primal, is subdued as the country develops 
economically and becomes more stable politically and socially.  
 
VII .  Discussion  
These results reinforce the idea that some puzzles about individual choice can best be 
explained by considering the interplay of personal and cultural factors.  For example, it is well-
known that the proportion of rejected offers in ultimatum games differs substantially between 
experiments conducted in different countries (Oosterbeek, Sloof and Van de Kuilen 2004, 
Heinrich et al. 2001, Fehr and Gaehter 2000). 
10   Although the average offers made by the first 
player in an ultimatum game is around 40% of the endowment in experiments conducted around 
the world,  the rejection rates differ substantially between countries, ranging from no rejected 
offers to one-third of the offers being rejected  (Oosterbeek, Sloof and Van de Kulien 2004).  
Similarly, there is significant variation in the rates antisocial punishment in experiments 
conducted in various countries (Herrmann, Thoni and Gaehter, 2008).  Although researchers 
recognize the complicated nature of behavioral responses in these environments, “culture” turns 
out to be a primary suspect as a determinant of behavior around the notions of fairness, 
individualism vs. collectivism, and retaliation.  The results of this paper suggest that the variation 
in these behaviors can be best explained by taking into account both the personal and the cultural 
factors as well as the interplay between them.   
On the other hand, country attributes are very important in explaining the extent of 
vengeful feelings.  Furthermore, the finding that repeated victimization makes people more 
                                                 
10 In an ultimatum game one player is given a certain amount of money (or tokens than can be used for 
money or other items at the end of the experiment). The first player then proposes a division of this 
money between him/herself and the second player.  If the second payer accepts the offer the game ends, 
and the players receive the proposed amount.  If the second player rejects the offer no player receives 
anything. 28 
vengeful only if they live in countries with less desirable economic and political environments 
seems to quantify a mechanism through which the observed “cycles violence” take place.  People 
in societies with low-income, low education, poor rule-of-law, and military conflict are more 
prone to heightened vengeful feelings.  Thus, violence between countries with these attributes 
may have a self-feeding mechanism that is fueled by retribution, if the impact of having been 
victimized by violence on vengeful feelings is as large as vengeance targeted towards a burglar, 
detected in this paper.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Although it has been argued that revenge is an integral part of human psyche, and 
vengeful behavior is common, there has been very limited research to quantify its extent.  The 
investigation of the existence of vengeance, its extent and its determinants may be important not 
only for theoretical and practical aspects of criminal justice system, but also because it may shed 
interesting light into extremely violent behavior such as suicide bombings and other terrorist 
attacks.  
This paper employs data on more than 89,000 individuals from 53 countries to directly 
investigate the presence and the extent of vengeful feelings.  Since the definition of vengeance is 
“infliction of punishment in return for a wrong committed,” the extent of vengeance is measured 
by the difference in the propensity to assign a particular punishment for the burglary of a color 
TV between two people: one, who has been burglarized himself/herself during this year or  last 
year, and the other, who has not been burglarized. Empirical analyses control for potential 
differences in victimization propensities and other factors that may be correlated with both the 
demand for punishment and likelihood of victimization. 29 
Descriptive statistics reveal that there are substantial differences between countries 
regarding the extent to which people are willing to impose harsh punishment.  For example, 
while 1% of the population in Belgium believes that a prison term of four years to life is 
appropriate for a 20 year old man who is found guilty of stealing a color TV as a second offense, 
the rate is about12 percent in the U.S., 19 percent in Paraguay, 21 percent in Mongolia, and 25 
percent in South Africa.  These average differences between countries are interesting, but they 
can be reflections of a number of country characteristics, ranging from the effectiveness of the 
legal system to economic conditions and culture. 
Individual-level analyses compare the reactions of observationally equivalent individuals, 
who differ in terms of their victimization experience.  The results show that people’s desire to 
impose stiffer punishment is positively related to their own victimization experience.  
Controlling for a large set of personal characteristics ranging from education, the rank of the 
family income in the income distribution of the country, to the crime rate of the region of the 
country, along with a host of  country attributes, having been a victim of burglary increases one’s 
willingness to impose harsh prison sentences on a hypothetical 20 year old burglar.     
The strength of vengeful feelings are influenced by country characteristics, such as per-
capita income, the extent of individualism and rule-of-law in the country, the extent of ethno-
linguistics fragmentation in the country and the existence or a war in recent history as well as 
uninterrupted democracy.  Vengeful feelings towards a burglar are not influenced by having been 
a victim of robbery, theft or bicycle theft, suggesting that the identified vengeance effect is not a 
reflection of a general demand for law and order or the demand for protection.  The findings, 
which are summarized in Table 7, indicate that the magnitude of vengeful feelings is greater for 
people in low-income countries, in countries with low levels of education, low level of rule-of-
law, and countries that experienced a war in recent history.  Females, older people, working 30 
people, people who live in high-crime areas of their country and  people who are at the bottom 
50% of their country’s income distribution are more vengeful.  The intensity of vengeful feelings 
dies off gradually over time.  Furthermore, the analysis of victims reveals that repeated 
victimization generates more vengeance, but this difference exists only in countries with poor 
economic and political circumstances.   
These results have implications on at least two fronts.  First, they suggest that a complete 
understanding of economic behavior should incorporate the context and the environment in 
which the decision is taking place, including measures of culture.  But also, they highlight the 
dangers of attributing too much of the impact to “culture” as the economic conditions pertaining 
to the individual (independent of culture) are important determinants of behavior.  For example, 
as summarized in Table 7, poor people who live in higher-income societies that are ethno-
linguistically homogeneous are as vengeful as rich people who live in low-income societies that 
are ethno-linguistically fragmented.    31 
Table 1 
The Proportion of People in Each Country   
Who Would Like to Impose the Following Punishment for Burglary 











United Kingdom  0.175  0.061 0.017 0.003 9,873 
Netherlands  0.064  0.026 0.009 0.001 4,031 
Switzerland  0.002  0.000 0.000 0.000 812 
Belgium  0.028  0.011 0.002 0.001 1,778 
Finland  0.012  0.004 0.001 0.000 3,344 
Norway  0.096  0.035 0.009 0.000 115 
Sweden  0.022  0.008 0.004 0.002 3,632 
Austria  0.007  0.002 0.001 0.000 1,254 
Denmark  0.014  0.004 0.002 0.000 2,637 
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
France  0.014  0.007 0.003 0.000 1,534 
Malta  0.130  0.047 0.014 0.003 906 
Spain  0.019  0.010 0.007 0.002 1,153 
Portugal  0.107  0.040 0.017 0.000 948 
Italy  0.049  0.024 0.010 0.000 716 
U.S., CANADA , AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND
United States  0.253  0.117 0.044 0.006 1,379 
Canada  0.218  0.159 0.136 0.027 4,611 
Australia  0.095  0.035 0.011 0.002 2,964 
New Zealand  0.045  0.017 0.004 0.002 1,504 
CENTRAL and EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Estonia  0.231  0.105 0.031 0.000 735 
Poland  0.091  0.034 0.011 0.002 7,868 
Czech Republic  0.163  0.062 0.016 0.000 2,355 
Slovakia  0.265  0.101 0.031 0.001 1,179 
Russia  0.237  0.123 0.049 0.009 1,282 
Georgia  0.340  0.201 0.072 0.026 1,842 
Slovenia  0.085  0.035 0.011 0.002 2,376 
Latvia  0.299  0.141 0.056 0.004 1,273 
Romania  0.581  0.409 0.221 0.010 958 
Hungary  0.189  0.089 0.048 0.006 660 
Yugoslavia  0.205  0.109 0.032 0.011 975 
Macedonia  0.108  0.055 0.022 0.008 603 
Croatia  0.030  0.009 0.000 0.000 865 
Ukraine  0.335  0.202 0.112 0.006 837 
Belarus  0.230  0.110 0.043 0.005 809 
Lithuania  0.252  0.094 0.035 0.003 1,090 
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(Table 1 concluded) 
ASIAN COUNTRIES 
Japan 0.120  0.040  0.016  0.003  1,155 
Indonesia 0.274  0.160  0.058  0.012  569 
Philippines 0.300  0.121  0.061  0.014  1,960 
India 0.302  0.170  0.099  0.009  1,398 
China 0.734  0.391  0.205  0.039  1,373 
Mongolia 0.441  0.211  0.068  0.003  762 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.186  0.096  0.028  0.004  1,564 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Uganda 0.515  0.270  0.116  0.016  1,209 
Egypt 0.380  0.183  0.070  0.005  573 
South Africa  0.467  0.247  0.106  0.008  1,578 
Tunisia 0.281  0.104  0.035  0.010  481 
Zimbabwe 0.571  0.330  0.167  0.069  801 
Botswana 0.557  0.397  0.296  0.142  388 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
Costa Rica  0.346  0.258  0.191  0.072  1,116 
Brazil 0.194  0.095  0.047  0.011  1,469 
Argentina 0.161  0.049  0.021  0.005  1,700 
Bolivia 0.272  0.143  0.056  0.018  767 
Paraguay 0.313  0.188  0.098  0.027  480 
Colombia 0.200  0.073  0.016  0.001  790 
 
The values in columns represent the proportion of individuals in each country who consider the sentence 
length displayed in column headings (e.g. two years or longer) as the appropriate punishment for a 
burglar.  The information pertains to individuals in each country who have non-missing values for all 














Victim of Burglary- 
This or last year 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent 








Victim of Burglary- 
Before Last Year 
Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent 









Dummy Variable(=1) it the respondent or 
someone else in the household owns a gun 
(other than air riffle) for any purpose other 







Male  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Upper Income  Dummy Variable (=1) if the family income 














Burglary Rate  The burglary rate in the region of the 







Small City  Dummy Variable(=1) if the respondent is 
living in a town with a population of 






Middle Size City  Dummy Variable(=1) if the respondent is 
living in a town with a population of 






Age20to24  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Age25to29   Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Age30to34  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Age35to39       Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Age40to44  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Age45to49  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Age50to54  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Age55to59  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Age60to64  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 
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Age65to69  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Age70+  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Single   Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Widowed  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Living together  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 
living together as a couple (but not married), 







Divorced    Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Working  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Looking for job  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Home keeper  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Retired/disabled  Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is 







Individualism  Index of the degree to which individuals 




Rule of Law  Index of the extent to which agents have 







The index of the extent of ethno-linguistic 




British Legal Origin  Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of 




French Legal Origin  Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of 




German Legal Origin  Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of 




Percent Catholic  Percent of Catholics in the country (E) 40.332
(34.718) 
  
Percent Muslim  Percent of Muslims in the country (E) 2.743
(11.128) 
  
Democratic  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country was 





Per-capita income  PPP adjusted Real per-capita income of the 









Population  Population of the country in millions in the 
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Population less than 
25 
Percentage of population less than 25 years 






Average education of adults in the country 




Women in Parliament  Percentage of women in parliament of the 




War  Dummy Variable (=1) if a war/civil conflict




Western Europe  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in 




Central Europe  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in 




Mediterranean  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in 




Asia  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in 




Africa  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in 




Latin America  Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in 




The descriptive statistics pertain to observations with non-missing values in all variables.  
A: UNICRI International Crime Victim Survey version ICVS2000_2(1)
B: “National Cultures of the World: A Statistical Reference”  (1997), Parker, Philip M., Greenwood Press.
C: Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, 
2002. ‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615–637. 
D: The causes of corruption: a cross-national study; Daniel Treisman, Journal of Public Economics 
76 (2000) , 399-457 
E: The Quality of Government; La Porta, Rafael et al., NBER Working Paper: 6727 (1998) 
F: World Development Indicators. CD 2003
G: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 
2006.. 
H: The State in a Changing World, World Development Report 1997, World Bank, Washington, DC:
Oxford University Press, 1997 
I: Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Massimo
Mastruzzi, The World Bank, June 30,2003 
J: World Bank, Education Statistics Database http://www1.worldbank.org/education/edstats/ 
K: United Nations Statistics Division, Common Database, Population by Sex, Age Group, Urban and 
Rural, Census Years, Series Number 14890: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb
L: Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee, "International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and 
Implications" (CID Working Paper No. 42, April 2000) – Human Capital Updated Files. 
M: Governance Matters 2007 – Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2006. 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/mc_countries.asp>. (June 13, 2008) 
N: Hofstede, Geert. “Cultural Dimensions,” <http://www.geert-hofstede.com/  hofstede_ 
dimensions.php> (June 13, 2008). 
P: Philip G. Roeder.  2001.   "Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985." 




Descriptive Statistics of Personal Characteristics by Victimization Status 
 
  Victim of Burglary-This or last year   Victim of Burglary- Before Last Year
  Yes   No   Yes   No
Variable Name  Mean    Std. 
Dev 
  Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. 
Dev 
  Mean Std. 
Dev
Gun  0.105    (0.307)    0.114 (0.318)   0.104 (0.306)    0.119 (0.324)
Male  0.458    (0.498)    0.477 (0.500)   0.457 (0.498)    0.480 (0.500)
Upper Income  0.484    (0.500)    0.483 (0.500)   0.482 (0.500)    0.516 (0.500)
Education  12.168    (3.501)    12.599 (3.676)   12.150 (3.501)    12.678 (3.625)
Burglary Rate  0.034    (0.030)    0.063 (0.053)   0.034 (0.031)    0.049 (0.046)
Age20to24  0.085    (0.279)    0.120 (0.325)   0.087 (0.282)    0.088 (0.284)
Age25to29  0.101    (0.301)    0.128 (0.334)   0.103 (0.304)    0.102 (0.303)
Age30to34  0.110    (0.313)    0.128 (0.335)   0.111 (0.314)    0.120 (0.325)
Age35to39  0.112    (0.315)    0.119 (0.323)   0.111 (0.315)    0.122 (0.328)
Age40to44  0.101    (0.301)    0.105 (0.306)   0.100 (0.300)    0.110 (0.313)
Age45to49  0.085    (0.278)    0.085 (0.279)   0.084 (0.278)    0.088 (0.284)
Age50to54  0.075    (0.264)    0.066 (0.249)   0.075 (0.263)    0.075 (0.263)
Age55to59  0.065    (0.247)    0.057 (0.231)   0.065 (0.246)    0.062 (0.242)
Age60to64  0.062    (0.242)    0.044 (0.205)   0.062 (0.240)    0.057 (0.232)
Age65to69  0.058    (0.233)    0.038 (0.191)   0.057 (0.232)    0.048 (0.213)
Age70+  0.095    (0.293)    0.053 (0.224)   0.094 (0.292)    0.070 (0.255)
Single  0.235    (0.424)    0.287 (0.452)   0.236 (0.425)    0.270 (0.444)
Widowed  0.079    (0.270)    0.056 (0.230)   0.078 (0.269)    0.067 (0.250)
Living together  0.053    (0.223)    0.055 (0.227)   0.053 (0.224)    0.051 (0.220)
Divorced  0.056    (0.231)    0.067 (0.249)   0.056 (0.230)    0.071 (0.257)
Working  0.582    (0.493)    0.603 (0.489)   0.580 (0.494)    0.616 (0.486)
Looking for job  0.060    (0.237)    0.074 (0.262)   0.061 (0.240)    0.059 (0.235)
Home keeper  0.099    (0.299)    0.105 (0.307)   0.100 (0.300)    0.092 (0.289)
Retired/disabled  0.177    (0.382)    0.121 (0.326)   0.176 (0.381)    0.144 (0.351)
   N  9,817-11,547    127,275-161,080   11,475-14,420    125,546-158,17837 
Table 4 
Ordered Probit Estimates 
Dependent Variable: Severity of Desired Punishment for Burglary 
Variables I  II  III 
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(Table 4 continued) 
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(Table 4 concluded) 













N 70,324  74,788  89,037 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country FE  No  No  Yes 
Log likelihood  -81,287  -87063  -104,265 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-level are in parentheses.  Statistical significance of  the  
coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***. 40 
Table 5 
Ordered Probit Estimates with additional Indicators of Victimization 
Dependent variable: Severity of Punishment for Burglary 
Variable  Robbery  Personal Theft  Bicycle Theft  Assault 


















Victim of  the Crime listed in the  
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N 74,684  74,478  74,523  74,444 
Log-likelihood  -88,333 -88,062 -88,125  -87,948
Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-level are in parentheses.  Statistical significance of  the  
coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***. 
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Table 6A 
The Preference for Punishment by Gender 
Probit regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
 Males  Females 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.020**  (0.009)  0.037***  (0.011) 
 [0.024***]  (0.009)  [0.033***]  (0.009) 
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.009  (0.010)  0.003  (0.011) 
  [0.008] (0.010) [0.006] (0.010) 
Gun 0.027**  (0.012)  0.007  (0.018) 
Upper Income   -0.006  (0.012)  -0.022**  (0.011) 
Education   -0.009*** (0.002) -0.011***  (0.002)
Burglary rate  0.534 (0.409) 0.340 (0.421)
N  35,443   39,345   
 [41,832]    [47,205]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.413  0.368 
 [0.413]  [0.371] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.024**  (0.011)  0.024***  (0.008) 
 [0.019**]  (0.009)  [0.024***]  (0.006) 
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.017*  (0.009)  0.017***  (0.006) 
 [0.016*]  (0.009)  [0.014**]  (0.006) 
Gun -0.002  (0.008)  0.000  (0.007) 
Upper Income   0.007  (0.007)  0.003  (0.007) 
Education   -0.002**  (0.001)  -0.003***  (0.001) 
Burglary rate  0.757**  (0.317)  0.551*  (0.282) 
N 35443    39345   
 [41454]    [47205]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.180 0.156 
 [0.189]  [0.168] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.011  (0.007)  0.013***  (0.004) 
 [0.015***]  (0.006)  [0.013***]  (0.004) 
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.005  (0.004)  0.007***  (0.003) 
  [0.005] (0.005) [0.005] (0.003) 
Gun 0.001 (0.005) -0.004  (0.004)
Upper Income   0.005 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
Education   0.000 (0.001) -0.002***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.383* (0.206) 0.195 (0.211)
N  35,443  39,296   
 [41,454]    [46,719]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.087 0.076 
 [0.092]  [0.083] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of 
Table 4.  The marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-
effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust 
standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  





The Preference for Punishment by Personal Education 
Probit Regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
  Highly-Educated person  Person with Low Education 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.021**  (0.011)  0.034***  (0.012) 
 [0.023**]  (0.010)  [0.031***]  (0.010) 
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.005  (0.011)  0.008  (0.014) 
  [0.001] (0.010) [0.012] (0.012) 
Gun 0.022  (0.015)  0.019  (0.012) 
Male 0.063***  (0.010)  0.049***  (0.010) 
Upper Income   0.001  (0.013)  -0.021**  (0.010) 
Education   -0.012***  (0.003)  0.002  (0.004) 
Burglary  rate  0.703*  (0.393 -0.126 (0.441) 
N 32,476    42,312   
 [38,564]    [50,472]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.362  0.413 
 [0.364]  [0.414] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.028***  (0.009)  0.019***  (0.007) 
 [0.023***]  (0.008)  [0.019***]  (0.006) 
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.018**  (0.009)  0.015  (0.010) 
  [0.016*]  (0.009) [0.012] (0.008) 
Gun 0.008  (0.007)  -0.006  (0.008) 
Male 0.031***  (0.004)  0.020***  (0.007) 
Upper Income   0.010  (0.007)  0.003  (0.006) 
Education   -0.005***  (0.001)  0.002  (0.002) 
Burglary rate  0.791***  (0.309)  0.424  (0.294) 
N 32,476    42,312   
 [38,564]    [50,159]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.154 0.179 
 [0.164]  [0.189] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.011**  (0.006)  0.011***  (0.003) 
 [0.013***]  (0.006)  [0.014***]  (0.004) 
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.001  (0.005)  0.010**  (0.005) 
 [-0.001]  (0.005)  [0.009**]  (0.004) 
Gun 0.004  (0.004)  -0.005  (0.004) 
Male 0.015***  (0.003)  0.003  (0.004) 
Upper Income   0.001  (0.003)  0.008***  (0.004) 
Education   -0.001**  (0.001)  0.000  (0.001) 
Burglary rate  0.379**  (0.168)  0.135  (0.231) 
N 32,476    42,312   
 [38,564]  [50,159] 
Mean of the dependent variable  0.074 0.087 
 [0.083]  [0.092] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4.  The 
marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country 
characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors of the marginal 
effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying probit coefficients at the  
10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***. 45 
Table 7 
Differential Strength of Vengeful Feelings by Groups 
  
 
Percentage  increase 
in the desire to 
impose any prison 
sentence due to 
victimization among  
people in the world 
with the characteristic 
listed in rows  
Percentage  increase in 
the desire to impose a 
prison sentence of at 
least 2 years due to 
victimization among  
the people in the world 
with characteristics 
listed in rows 
Percentage  increase in 
the desire to impose a 
prison sentence of at 
least 4 years due to 
victimization  among  
people in the world 
with the characteristic 
listed in rows  
 PERSONAL  CHARACTERISTICS     
A1 Males  5% [6%]  23% [19%]  0% [16%] 
A2 Females  10% [9%]  26% [23%]  26% [16%] 
B1  More Educated People (in own country)  6% [6%]  30% [24%]  15% [16%] 
B2  Less Educated People (in own country)  8% [8%]  11% [10%]  25% [25%] 
C1  Older People (Age≥40) 7% [7%]  26% [21%]  18% [19%] 
C2  Younger People   8% [7%]  15% [13%]  13% [13%] 
D1  People in the top 50% of  the income distribution (in own 
country) 
10% [8%] 22% [19%]  9% [9%] 
D2  People in the bottom 50% of  the income distribution   5% [7%]  26% [22%]  30% [22%] 
E1 Working  People  8% [8%]  29% [25%]  23% [23%] 
E2 Non-Working  People  7% [6%]  17% [14%] 11% [8%]
F1  People who live in High-burglary areas 9% [9%]  24% [20%] 24% [16%]
F2  People who live in Low -burglary areas 0% [0%]  16% [14%] 0% [0%]
 COUNTRY  CHARACTERISTICS       
G1  People who live in countries where average country 
education is above the world median (8 years)  
6% [7%] 8% [8%] 8% [12%]
G2  People who live in countries where average country 
education is below the world median (8 years)
7% [8%]  33% [32%] 31% [33%]
H1  People who live in countries where there was at least one war 
or military conflict since 1975 
4% [4%]  24% [22%] 27% [30%]
H2  People who live in countries with no war or military conflict 
since 1975 
10% [10%]  17% [15%] 12% [16%]
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I1  People who live in countries where the Rule-of-law rating is 
above the world median 
7% [7%] 10% [12%]  0% [0%] 
I2  People who live in countries where the Rule-of-law rating is 
below the world median 
6% [7%] 27% [21%]  29% [21%] 
J1  People who live in richer countries (mean GDP per capita is 
greater than 8000$) 
6% [8%] 0% [9%]  0% [0%] 
J2  People who live in poorer countries (mean GDP per capita is 
smaller than 8000$). 
6% [6%] 30% [22%]  34% [29%] 
K1  People who live in more Individualistic countries  6% [7%]  12% [0%]  8% [15%] 
K2  People who live in less Individualistic countries  8% [8%]  29% [28%]  17% [16%] 
L1  People who live in countries with higher ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation 
6% [7%] 25% [24%]  22% [17%] 
L2  People who live in countries with lower ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation 
8% [6%] 15% [10%]  15% [15%] 
M1  People who live in countries with uninterrupted Democracy  12% [12%]  11% [11%]  0% [0%] 
M2  People who live in countries with interrupted Democracy  6% [6%]  31% [22%]  37% [31%] 
N1  Low GDP, High ethno-linguistic fragmentation, Rich person  9% [11%]  14% [17%]  21% [22%] 
N2  High GDP, Low ethno-linguistic fragmentation, Poor person  6% [6%]  23% [19%]  21% [21%] 
O1  No war, High local burglary rate, Old and poor person  14% [11%]  23% [15%]  33% [0 %] 
O2  War, Low local burglary rate, Young  and rich person  7% [7%]  22% [19%]  14% [11%] 
 
For each row, the cells depict the percentage increase in the proportion of people in that row who would like to assign the punishment listed in 
column headings if the people listed in the row were victimized.  The values are calculated using the marginal effects reported in Tables 6A-6M 
and the relevant mean values of desired punishment.  The values in [brackets] have the same meaning, except that they are based on the marginal 










Differential Impact of More Frequent Victimization 
Among Victims with Various Characteristics 
    Percentage  increase in the 
desire to impose any prison 
sentence due to more frequent 
victimization among  
victimized people in the world 
with the characteristic listed in 
rows  
Percentage  increase in the desire 
to impose a prison sentence of at 
least 2 years due to more 
frequent victimization among  
victimized people in the world 
with characteristics listed in 
rows 
Percentage  increase in the 
desire to impose a prison 
sentence of at least 4 years 
due to more frequent 
victimization  among  
victimized people in the world 
with the characteristic listed in 
rows 
A1  People who live in countries where average country 
education is above the world median (8 years)  
0% [0%]  0% [0%]  0% [0%] 
A2  People who live in countries where average country 
education is below the world median (8 years) 
0% [0%]  18% [0%]  0% [0%] 
B1  People who live in countries with no war or military 
conflict since 1975 
0% [0%]  0% [0%]  0% [0%] 
B2  People who live in countries where there was at least 
one war or military conflict since 1975 
0% [0%]  23% [18%]  19% [18%] 
C1  People who live in countries where the Rule-of-law 
rating is above the world median 
0% [0%]  0% [0%]  0% [0%] 
C2  People who live in countries where the Rule-of-law 
rating is below the world median 
0% [0%]  26% [0%]  18% [0%] 
D1  People who live in richer countries (mean GDP per 
capita is greater than 8000$) 
0% [0%]  0% [0%]  0% [0%] 
D2  People who live in poorer countries (mean GDP per 
capita is smaller than 8000$). 
0% [0%]  16% [0%]  0% [0%] 
E1  People who live in more Individualistic countries  0%  [0%]  0%  [0%]  0%  [0%] 
E2  People who live in less Individualistic countries  0%  [0%]  22%  [21%]  0%  [0%] 
F1  People who live in countries with lower ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation 
0% [0%]  0% [0%]  0% [-23%] 
F2  People who live in countries with higher ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation 
0% [0%]  0% [0%]  19% [0%] 
G1  People who live in countries with uninterrupted 
Democracy 
0% [0%]  0% [0%]  0% [0%] 
G2  People who live in countries with interrupted 
Democracy 
28% [0%]  21% [0%]  0% [0%] 
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Table 6C 
The Preference for Punishment by Personal Income 
Probit Regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
 
If the family Income is in the 
top 50% of  Income Distr.
If the family Income is in the 
bottom 50% of  Inc. Distr.
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.037*** (0.010) 0.022**  (0.010)
  [0.031***] (0.009) [0.028***]  (0.010)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.010 (0.012) 0.003 (0.011)
  [0.010] (0.011) [0.006]  (0.011)
Gun  0.032*** (0.012) 0.009 (0.013)
Male  0.065*** (0.009) 0.042***  (0.011)
Upper Income       
Education   -0.010*** (0.002) -0.010***  (0.002)
Burglary rate  -0.009 (0.520) 0.570 (0.389)
N  38,527   36,261   
  [45,625]   [43,412]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.370 0.416
  [0.374] [0.413] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.018*** (0.007) 0.030***  (0.010)
  [0.017***] (0.006) [0.027***]  (0.009)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.016** (0.009) 0.017**  (0.008)
  [0.014*] (0.008) [0.015*]  (0.008)
Gun  0.007 (0.007) -0.007  (0.011)
Male  0.027*** (0.006) 0.023***  (0.006)
Upper Income       
Education   -0.003** (0.001) -0.003***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.113 (0.274) 0.933***  (0.265)
N  38,527   36,261   
  [45,625]   [43,020]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0 .158 0.180
  [0.168] [0.190] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.007* (0.004) 0.017***  (0.006)
  [0.008**] (0.004) [0.020***]  (0.005)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.004 (0.004) 0.008**  (0.004)
  [0.004] (0.004) [0.005]  (0.004)
Gun  0.002 (0.004) -0.003  (0.006)
Male  0.010*** (0.004) 0.008***  (0.003)
Upper Income       
Education   -0.001 (0.001) -0.001*  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.009 (0.173) 0.392*  (0.229)
N  38,527   36,242   
  [45,205]   [42,997]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.079 0.085
  [0.085] [0.090] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4.  The 
marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country 
characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, 
clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying probit coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 
1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***.   55
 
 Table 6D  
The Preference for Punishment by Age 
Probit Regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
  Age ≥40 Age<40 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.024*** (0.009) 0.032***  (0.008)
  [0.025***] (0.009) [0.030***]  (0.008)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.005 (0.007) 0.007 (0.011)
  [0.007] (0.007) [0.008]  (0.010)
Gun  0.020* (0.012) 0.023 (0.014)
Male  0.080*** (0.010) 0.028***  (0.010)
Upper Income   -0.013 (0.012) -0.010  (0.011)
Education   -0.010*** (0.002) -0.009***  (0.002)
Burglary rate  0.008 (0.457) 0.698 (0.393)
N  40,147   34,641   
  [47,714]   [41,322]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.356 0.428
  [0.363] [0.421] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.018*** (0.007) 0.029***  (0.008)
  [0.017] (0.006) [0.026***]  (0.008)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.019*** (0.007) 0.014 (0.010)
  [0.017] (0.007) [0.012]  (0.008)
Gun  -0.002 (0.006) 0.003 (0.010)
Male  0.031*** (0.006) 0.019***  (0.006)
Upper Income   0.000 (0.007) 0.013*  (0.007)
Education   -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002  (0.002)
Burglary rate  0.443 (0.313) 0.836***  (0.309)
N  40,147   34,641   
  [47,714]   [41,322]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.144 0.193
  [0 .158] [0.198] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.012*** (0.004) 0.012***  (0.005)
  [0.015***] (0.004) [0.013***]  (0.005)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.005 (0.003) 0.007 (0.005)
  [0.004] (0.004) [0.005]  (0.004)
Gun  0.001 (0.004) -0.002  (0.005)
Male  0.012*** (0.003) 0.006 (0.004)
Upper Income   0.002 (0.004) 0.008***  (0.004)
Education   -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.280 (0.167) 0.285 (0.271)
N  40,147   34,641   
  [47,243]   [40,981]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.070 0.093
  [0.078] [0.096] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4.  The 
marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country 
characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, 
clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying probit coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 
1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***.   56
 
Table 6E 
The Preference for Punishment by Labor Market Status 
Probit Regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
  Working Non-working 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.030*** (0.010) 0.026**  (0.011)
  [0.030***] (0.009) [0.024***]  (0.009)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.001 (0.011) 0.013 (0.011)
  [0.003] (0.010) [0.013]  (0.011)
Gun  0.022* (0.013) 0.019 (0.015)
Male  0.056*** (0.008) 0.053***  (0.014)
Upper Income   -0.014 (0.010) -0.010  (0.015)
Education   -0.011*** (0.002) -0.007***  (0.002)
Burglary rate  0.536 (0.448) 0.216 (0.385)
N  44,961   29,827   
  [52,843]   [36,193]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.389 0 .394
  [0.390] [0.395] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.031*** (0.009) 0.014*  (0.009)
  [0.028***] (0.008) [0.012*]  (0.008)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.016** (0.008) 0.017**  (0.009)
  [0.014*] (0.008) [0.014*]  (0.008)
Gun  0.005 (0.007) -0.011  (0.009)
Male  0.028*** (0.005) 0.018**  (0.008)
Upper Income   0.002 (0.006) 0.006 (0.009)
Education   -0.003** (0.001) -0.003***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.670** (0.299) 0.615*  (0.329)
N  44,961   29,827   
  [52,843]   [35,922]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0 .163 0 .176
  [0.172] [0.188] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.018*** (0.006) 0.003 (0.005)
  [0.019***] (0.005) [0.004]  (0.005)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.004 (0.004) 0.009**  (0.005)
  [0.004] (0.004) [0.008**]  (0.004)
Gun  0.002 (0.003) -0.006  (0.005)
Male  0.012*** (0.003) 0.003 (0.005)
Upper Income   0.003 (0.003) 0.006 (0.005)
Education   0.000 (0.001) -0.002***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.322 (0.192) 0.212 (0.250)
N  44,961   29,827   
  [52,302]   [35,917]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.078 0 .087
  [0.084] [0.092] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4.  The 
marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country 
characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, 
clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying probit coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 
1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***.   57
Table 6F 
The Preference for Punishment by Local Crime 
Probit Regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
  High Burglary Rate  Low Burglary Rate 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.037*** (0.007) 0.003 (0.014)
  [0.035***] (0.007) [0.006]  (0.015)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.007 (0.008) 0.007 (0.012)
  [0.009] (0.009) [0.008]  (0.012)
Gun  0.011 (0.011) 0.036***  (0.013)
Male  0.058*** (0.009) 0.047***  (0.012)
Upper Income   -0.019 (0.013) -0.002  (0.008)
Education   -0.010*** (0.002) -0.010***  (0.002)
Burglary rate  0.666 (0.464) 0.957 (1.005)
N  47,678   27,110   
  [59,633]   [28,964]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.409 0.359
  [0.407] [0.369] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.030*** (0.009) 0.009 (0.007)
  [0.026***] (0.007) [0.009]  (0.008)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.016*** (0.006) 0.020**  (0.010)
  [0.014**] (0.007) [0.019**]  (0.010)
Gun  -0.011 (0.007) 0.015**  (0.007)
Male  0.026*** (0.007) 0.022***  (0.005)
Upper Income   0.006 (0.008) 0.002 (0.005)
Education   -0.004*** (0.001) -0.002*  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.438 (0.422) 0.519 (0.749)
N  47,678   27,110   
  [59,633]   [28,964]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.192 0.126
  [0.200] [0.136] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.016*** (0.006) 0.002 (0.006)
  [0.016***] (0.005) [0.005]  (0.007)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.007* (0.004) 0.006 (0.005)
  [0.005] (0.004) [0.008]  (0.006)
Gun  -0.005 (0.004) 0.006 (0.004)
Male  0.009** (0.004) 0.007***  (0.003)
Upper Income   0.007* (0.004) 0.002 (0.003)
Education   -0.002*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
Burglary rate  0.179 (0.293) 0.179 (0.595)
N  47,678   27,110   
  [59,633]   [28,152]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.095 0.057
  [0.100] [0.063] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 
4.  The marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead 
of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors 
of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying 
probit coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***.   58
Table 6G 
The Preference for Punishment by Country Income 
Probit Regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
  Per-capita GDP>$8,000 Per-capita GDP≤$8,000
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.021*** (0.008) 0.034***  (0.012)
  [0.025***] (0.008) [0.030***]  (0.010)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.004 (0.008) 0.008 (0.018)
  [0.009] (0.008) [0.004]  (0.016)
Gun  0.024** (0.011) 0.021 (0.024)
Male  0.065*** (0.008) 0.010 (0.024)
Upper Income   -0.019** (0.009) 0.011 (0.014)
Education   -0.010*** (0.002) -0.009***  (0.003)
Burglary rate  -0.251 (0.294) 0.078 (0.559)
N  56,986   17,802   
  [60,337]   [28,700]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.335 0.568
  [0.337] [0.506] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.009 (0.006) 0.058***  (0.014)
  [0.008] (0.006) [0.044***]  (0.011)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.008 (0.007) 0.044***  (0.016)
  [0.010*] (0.006) [0.025**]  (0.012)
Gun  0.003 (0.004) 0.008 (0.030)
Male  0.021*** (0.004) 0.032*  (0.018)
Upper Income   0.001 (0.006) 0.015 (0.013)
Education   -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*  (0.002)
Burglary rate  0.170 (0.174) 0.204 (0.765)
N  56,986   17,802   
  [60,337]   [28,700]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.114 0.341
  [0.114] [0.309] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.004 (0.003) 0.035***  (0.014)
  [0.004] (0.003) [0.034***]  (0.009)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.001 (0.003) 0.026***  (0.011)
  [0.003] (0.003) [0.013*]  (0.008)
Gun  0.002 (0.002) -0.004  (0.016)
Male  0.008*** (0.002) 0.004 (0.010)
Upper Income   0.002 (0.003) 0.014 (0.011)
Education   -0.001*** (0.000) -0.003***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.003 (0.102) 0.071 (0.554)
N  56,986   17,802   
  [59,525]   [28,700]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.049 0.183
  [0.050] [0.164] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 
4.  The marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead 
of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors 
of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying 
probit coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***.   59
Table 6H 
The Preference for Punishment by Country Individualism 
Probit Regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
  Highly- Indiv.  Society Collectivist Society 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.024*** (0.008) 0.031***  (0.011)
  [0.024***] (0.008) [0.031***]  (0.011)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.010 (0.011) -0.002  (0.011)
  [0.008] (0.009) [0.004]  (0.010)
Gun  0.019 (0.014) 0.042***  (0.015)
Male  0.069*** (0.010) 0.037***  (0.012)
Upper Income   -0.024*** (0.009) -0.004  (0.014)
Education   -0.013*** (0.003) -0.012***  (0.003)
Burglary rate  0.277 (0.194) 0.637 (0.406)
N  37,824   36,964   
  [52,073]   [36,964]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.368 0.414
  [0.376] [0.414] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.003 (0.006) 0.042***  (0.008)
  [0.007] (0.006) [0.040]  (0.008)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.015** (0.007) 0.019**  (0.010)
  [0.011] (0.008) [0.018]  (0.009)
Gun  0.000 (0.006) 0.016*  (0.009)
Male  0.020*** (0.006) 0.029***  (0.007)
Upper Income   -0.006 (0.005) 0.012 (0.009)
Education   -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.580*** (0.145) 0.460 (0.403)
N  37,824   36,964   
  [52,073]   [36,964]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.128 0.208
  [0.156] [0.208] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.004 (0.003) 0.017***  (0.007)
  [0.011***] (0.004) [0.016***]  (0.006)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.005* (0.003) 0.008 (0.005)
  [0.002] (0.004) [0.007]  (0.005)
Gun  0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.007)
Male  0.009** (0.004) 0.007**  (0.003)
Upper Income   -0.002 (0.003) 0.010**  (0.004)
Education   -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.258** (0.110) 0.126 (0.250)
N  37,012   36,964   
  [51,261]   [36,964]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.061 0.103
  [0.076] [0.103] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 
4.  The marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead 
of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors 
of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying 
probit coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***.   60
Table 6I 
The Preference for Punishment by the level of the Rule-of-Law 
Probit Regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
  High Rule of Law Low Rule of Law 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.023*** (0.008) 0.029***  (0.010)
  [0.022***] (0.008) [0.030***]  (0.009)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.009 (0.009) -0.002  (0.013)
  [0.011] (0.008) [0.003]  (0.011)
Gun  0.023** (0.011) 0.038**  (0.019)
Male  0.066*** (0.007) 0.032**  (0.015)
Upper Income   -0.018** (0.009) -0.009  (0.014)
Education   -0.012*** (0.003) -0.009***  (0.0039
Burglary rate  0.105 (0.245) 1.184***  (0.400)
N  44,365   30,423   
  [45,340]   [43,697]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.331 0.477
  [0.333] [0.453] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.003 (0.005) 0.047***  (0.010)
  [0.001] (0.005) [0.039***]  (0.008)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.011* (0.006) 0.023**  (0.011)
  [0.013**] (0.006) [0.015]  (0.009)
Gun  0.004 (0.005) 0.008 (0.016)
Male  0.018*** (0.003) 0.032***  (0.011)
Upper Income   -0.001 (0.005) 0.013 (0.011)
Education   -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.181 (0.156) 1.422***  (0.506)
N  44,365   30,423   
  [45,340]   [43,697]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.103 0.263
  [0.105] [0.253] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.001 (0.002) 0.025***  (0.008)
  [0.001] (0.003) [0.026***]  (0.006)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.002 (0.002) 0.012**  (0.007)
  [0.004] (0.003) [0.007]  (0.006)
Gun  0.003 (0.002) -0.005  (0.009)
Male  0.007*** (0.002) 0.007 (0.006)
Upper Income   0.000 (0.002) 0.016**  (0.007)
Education   -0.001*** (0.000) -0.003***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.042 (0.083) 0.506 (0.419)
N  44,365   30,423   
  [44,528]   [43,697]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.046 0.132
  [0.048] [0.127] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 
4.  The marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead 
of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors 
of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying 
probit coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***.   61
Table 6J 
The Preference for Punishment by the Existence of Armed Conflict in Country 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
 
Armed Conflict or War 
 
No War or Armed Conflict 
 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.021** (0.009) 0.029***  (0.009)
  [0.021***] (0.008) [0.030***]  (0.009)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.009 (0.014) 0.003 (0.007)
  [0.016] (0.012) [0.001]  (0.008)
Gun  0.007 (0.030) 0.025***  (0.008)
Male  0.040* (0.021) 0.057***  (0.010)
Upper Income   -0.028* (0.015) -0.005  (0.009)
Education   -0.012** (0.005) -0.010***  (0.002)
Burglary rate  2.006*** (0.770) 0.127 (0.178)
N  26,504   48,284   
  [33,042]   [55,995]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.570 0.293  
  [0.532]   [0.310]   
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.031* (0.017) 0.018***  (0.004)
  [0.024*] (0.013) [0.019***]  (0.005)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.037*** (0.013) 0.006 (0.004)
  [0.036***] (0.011) [0.003]  (0.005)
Gun  -0.013 (0.020) 0.008*  (0.004)
Male  0.041*** (0.013) 0.016***  (0.004)
Upper Income   -0.001 (0.011) 0.003 (0.005)
Education   -0.006** (0.003) -0.002***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  2.787*** (0.593) 0.040 (0.188)
N  26,504   48,284   
  [33,042]   [55,995]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.285 0.104
  [0.266]   [0.126]   
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.020** (0.010) 0.006**  (0.003)
  [0.020***] (0.008) [0.010***]  (0.003)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.016*** (0.006) 0.001 (0.002)
  [0.019***] (0.006) [-0.002]  (0.003)
Gun  -0.011 (0.011) 0.004*  (0.002)
Male  0.013 (0.010) 0.006***  (0.002)
Upper Income   0.006 (0.009) 0.002 (0.002)
Education   -0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000)
Burglary rate  1.591*** (0.258) -0.166  (0.159)
N  26,504   48,284   
  [33,042]   [55,183]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.135   0.052  
  [0.129] [0.063] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 
4.  The marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead 
of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors 
of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying 
probit coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***.   62
Table 6K 
Preference for Punishment by Country Education 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
 
Country Education above 
World Median
Country Education below 
World Median 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.022*** (0.007) 0.038***  (0.013)
  [0.023***] (0.008) [0.039***]  (0.011)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.006 (0.008) 0.009 (0.017)
  [0.003] (0.008) [0.019]  (0.015)
Gun  0.020** (0.010) 0.048***  (0.018)
Male  0.062*** (0.008) 0.017 (0.023)
Upper Income   -0.011 (0.010) -0.011  (0.017)
Education   -0.010*** (0.002) -0.011***  (0.003)
Burglary rate  -0.015 (0.263) -0.609  (0.728)
N  56,690   18,098   
  [66,451]   [22,586]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.341 0.547
  [0.353] [0.508] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.010* (0.006) 0.055***  (0.012)
  [0.011*] (0.006) [0.046***]  (0.010)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.009 (0.007) 0.041***  (0.015)
  [0.006] (0.007) [0.036***]  (0.012)
Gun  0.000 (0.005) 0.018 (0.017)
Male  0.020*** (0.005) 0.039***  (0.013)
Upper Income   0.003 (0.006) 0.009 (0.013)
Education   -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004**  (0.002)
Burglary rate  0.225 (0.180) -0.285  (0.741)
N  56,690   18,098   
  [66,451]   [22,586]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.129 0.290
  [0.150] [0.259] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.005** (0.003) 0.029***  (0.012)
  [0.009***] (0.003) [0.027***]  (0.009)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.002 (0.002) 0.017*  (0.010)
  [0.001] (0.003) [0.017**]  (0.008)
Gun  0.000 (0.002) 0.005 (0.014)
Male  0.007*** (0.003) 0.010 (0.007)
Upper Income   0.003 (0.003) 0.007 (0.010)
Education   -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002**  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.058 (0.095) -0.168  (0.416)
N  56,690   18,098   
  [65,639]   [22,586]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.060 0.150
  [0.072] [0.132] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 
4.  The values reported in [brackets] are the obtained from the regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of 
country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors of 
the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying probit 
coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***. 63 
Table 6L 
Preference for Punishment by Democracy in Country 
The Preference for Punishment 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
  Uninterrupted Democracy Interrupted Democracy
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.026*** (0.007) 0.028**  (0.012)
  [0.027***] (0.007) [0.027***]  (0.009)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.014* (0.008) -0.008  (0.011)
  [0.014*] (0.008) [-0.001]  (0.012)
Gun  0.020* (0.011) 0.040**  (0.019)
Male  0.070*** (0.007) 0.029**  (0.014)
Upper Income   -0.023*** (0.009) 0.005 (0.011)
Education   -0.012*** (0.002) -0.009***  (0.003)
Burglary rate  -0.135 (0.224) 0.165 (0.562)
N  42,698   32,090   
  [42,698]   [46,339]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.345 0.452
  [0.345] [0.435] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.003 (0.005) 0.051***  (0.010)
  [0.003]   (0.005) [0.036***]  (0.008)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.012** (0.006) 0.023**  (0.010)
  [0. 012**] (0.007) [0.015*]  (0.009)
Gun  0.004 (0.004) 0.008 (0.015)
Male  0.020*** (0.003) 0.029***  (0.010)
Upper Income   -0.004 (0.005) 0.014**  (0.007)
Education   -0.003*** (0.001) -0.005***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  0.007 (0.248) 0.387 (0.604)
N  42,698   32,090   
  [42,698]   [46,339]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.114 0.240
  [0.114] [0.236] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.001 (0.002) 0.027***  (0.009)
  [0.001] (0.001) [0.025***]  (0.006)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.001 (0.002) 0.016***  (0.006)
  [0.001] (0.003) [0.010**]  (0.005)
Gun  0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.009)
Male  0.006*** (0.003) 0.008 (0.005)
Upper Income   -0.002 (0.002) 0.013**  (0.005)
Education   -0.001** (0.000) -0.002***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  -0.092 (0.157) 0.208 (0.338)
N  42,698   32,090   
  [41,886]   [46,339]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.055 0.116
  [0.056] [0.116] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 
4.  The marginal effects  reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead 
of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors 
of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying 
probit coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***.   64
Table 6M 
Preference for Punishment by Ethno-linguistics Fragmentation 
Probit Regressions 
  Preference for any Jail or Prison Time  
  Heterogeneous Society Homogenous Society
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.029*** (0.008) 0.023*  (0.012)
  [0.032***] (0.007) [0.018*]  (0.011)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.005 (0.011) 0.010 (0.009)
  [0.010] (0.010) [0.002]  (0.010)
Gun  0.019 (0.015) 0.037***  (0.011)
Male  0.050*** (0.014) 0.056***  (0.012)
Upper Income   -0.006 (0.017) -0.011  (0.007)
Education   -0.012*** (0.003) -0.009***  (0.002)
Burglary rate  0.766*** (0.310) 0.096 (0.406)
N  36,902   37,886   
  [46,437]   [42,600]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.482 0.303
  [0.460] [0.318] 
  Preference for at least 2 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.027*** (0.011) 0.018***  (0.006)
  [0.027***] (0.009) [0.013***]  (0.005)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.027*** (0.009) 0.005 (0.006)
  [0.025***] (0.008) [0.001]  (0.007)
Gun  0.001 (0.009) 0.011***  (0.005)
Male  0.032*** (0.009) 0.017***  (0.004)
Upper Income   0.015 (0.012) 0.000 (0.005)
Education   -0.005** (0.002) -0.004***  (0.001)
Burglary rate  1.099*** (0.434) 0.396 (0.290)
N  36,902   37,886   
  [46,437]   [42,600]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.214 0.124
  [0.218] [0.133] 
  Preference for at least 4 years in Prison 
Victim of Burglary- This or last year  0.015** (0.007) 0.008**  (0.004)
  [0.019***] (0.006) [0.009***]  (0.004)
Victim of Burglary- Before last year  0.009** (0.005) 0.003 (0.004)
  [0.007] (0.005) [0.003]  (0.004)
Gun  0.000 (0.006) 0.005 (0.004)
Male  0.011* (0.007) 0.006***  (0.002)
Upper Income   0.014* (0.008) 0.000 (0.003)
Education   -0.002*** (0.001) -0.001***  (0.000)
Burglary rate  0.421 (0.380) 0.132 (0.120)
N  36,090   37,886   
  [45,625]   [42,600]   
Mean of the dependent variable  0.110 0.056
  [0.113] [0.060] 
The reported values are the marginal effects.  Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 
4.  The values reported in [brackets] are the obtained from the regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of 
country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.  Robust standard errors of 
the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses.   Statistical significance of  the underlying probit 
coefficients at the  10% , 5% and 1% level  are indicated by *, **, and ***. 